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STUDENT NOTES
separate income tax return covering one-half the community in-
come. With one possible exception the Federal government has
a uniform policy now in both community property and other
states. Up to June 26, 1922, the Treasury Department permitted
a husband and wife, who had originally elected to file a joint re-
turn, to file amended separate returns, but on that date a con-
trary ruling was made, so that now they may have to pay a higher
tax based on their aggregate income."
If it be said that the Hoeper case, in which Mr. Justice
Roberts also wrote the majority opinion, stands for uniformity in
state and federal income tax administration, the answer is simply
that the only desirable uniformity is as to the federal law. The
state of Wisconsin has said expressly that the husband shall be so
taxed and has applied this law for over twenty years. It would
seem that the "benign" attitude evinced so recently toward other
legislation might have permitted Wisconsin to continue to tax
incomes in this manner.'
-BERNARD SCLOVE.
CONTEMPT OF COURT - FALSIFICATioN OF EVIDENCE. - A
federal judge sitting in New York deplores the loose ideas of
testifying now current in our courts and the numerous perjuries
on the witness stand that escape notice.1 Rather than stop short
with deprecatory remarks regarding this evil, as other juristic
commentators are prone to do, he proceeded to sentence a witness
who had perjured himself for contempt of court. The witness, J.
D., had testified that he was on board a certain scow at the time
of its sinking and that he had seen the accident. Two other wit-
nesses testified that they had met J. D. when he arrived on the
scene of the disaster, and at that time he was first informed of the
sinking of the scow. J. D. thereupon confessed that he had lied,
and the judge held him in contempt of court for having wilfully
testified falsely. The Dunnigan Sisters.'
Whether perjury can be summarily punished as contempt of
court is a question which often arises. The cases seem to agree
1" The Revenue Act of 1928, § 51 (b) (1) and (2). See also Sol. Op. 90,
TreasurT Dept. Cumulative Bull. No. 4, p. 236 (June 1921).
Y70'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251, 51
S. Ct. 130 (1931); (1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 374.
"The Dunnigan Sisters, 53 F. (2d) 502 (D. C., S. D. X. Y., 1931).
Ibid.
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that perjury may constitute contempt of court if it is obstructive
of the due administration of justice, but there is a variance re-
garding the manner in which the falsehood must appear and the
essential elements of the offense. Occasionally the constitutional
questions of double jeopardy and right to trial by jury arise and
must be disposed of.
The power to punish for contempt has long been recognized
as inherent in all courts of record. The power is essential to the
very existence of the court and its protection, for, without it, all
other powers conferred upon the court could not be effectively
exercised and the orderly administration of justice would be an
impossibility.' Without this power, the machinery for enforcing
obedience to judgments, orders, and judicial writs could not
possibly function.' As to what ccnstitutes contempt, we have the
definition of the West Virginia Court, which is typical of many
others; "Contempt is defined as an act in disrespect of the court
or its processes, or which obstructs the administration of justice,
or tends to bring the court into disrepute." 5  Obviously, almost
any act of embarrassment to the court might be brought under the
generality of its terms. However, the acts punishable as con-
tempts have been, more or less, pigeon-holed, and there seems to
be no disposition on the part of the courts to make an arbitrary
extension of their power. One well defined class of contempts is
that of the witness who deliberately gives false evidence in court.
The trend of modern decisions is to punish perjuring witnesses
more freely for contempt, and thus by the exercise of a recognized
judicial process the courts are bringing about an important judi-
cial reform without outside aid.
A refusal to answer questions, either before a grand or petit
jury, has been held a contempt,' because it obstructs the adminis-
tration of justice, and it has been said that prevarication by a
witness has the same effect upon the administration of justice as
a refusal to answer, and, therefore, it is a direct contempt of the
8 State v. Frew, 24 W. Va. 416 (1884); Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S.
324, 24 S. Ct. 665 (1904).
1 Ez parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505 (1873) ; Joyce v. Everson, 161 Ind. 440,
443, 69 N. E. 135 (1903).
r State v. Hansford, 43 W. Va. 773, 28 S. E. 791 (1897).
OKendrick v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 490 (1884) refusing to testify before
a grand jury; Berkson v. People, 154 Ill. 81, 39 N. E. 1079 (1894) refusal
of a judgment debtor to testify concerning the disposition of his property;
Tavenner v. Morehead, 41 W. Va. 116, 23 S. E. 675 (1895) refusal to give
evidence before a notary.
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authority of the court.' The requisites of the offense are three:
1. The court must have judicial knowledge of the falsity of the
testimony. 2. The act must have an obstructive effect. 3. The
question asked the witness must be pertinent to the issue. False
testimony given in bankruptcy cases has been held punishable as
contempt under § 41 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898: "A person
shall not in proceedings before a referee .... after having taken
the oath, refuse to be examined according to law."' A refusal to
be examined according to law consists of a refusal to answer a
question, a deliberate falsehood, or an evasive answer.' Mere
perjury, though, is not punishable as a contempt. The federal
cases follow a test stated in the case of United States V. Appel:10
Does the testimony on its mere face, without collateraZ inquiry,
appear to be a bona fide effort to answer the question at all? If
the witness should pretend to be ignorant of facts which obviously
would be known to anyone who has sufficient intellect to perform
the most ordinary duties of life, his testimony would be palpably
false and he should be punished for contempt. An example
is a statement that the witness did not remember where he slept
the night before. Sham or evasive answers of "I don't know",
or "I don't remember", come within the scope of the test. The
federal test, though, is supposed to preclude the judge from weigh-
ing the plausibility of the evidence before him by a consideration
of extraneous evidence. Notwithstanding the supposed limits es-
tablished by this test, the case of Ex parte Hudgings" goes further
than the ordinary run of cases. A witness was punished for false
swearing although there was nothing in his testimony to show
plainly that it was false. The court merely formed that opinion
from a consideration of all the evidence. The case illustrates the
71n re Gitkin, 164 Fed. 71 (D. C., B. D. Pa., 1908); In re Rosenberg,
90 Wis. 581, 63 N. W. 1065, 64 N. W. 299 (1895); Riley v. Wallace, 188 Ky.
471, 222 S. W. 1085, (1920).8 I re Gitkin, supra n. 7; In re Fellerman, 149 Fed. 244 (D. C., S. D. N.
Y., 1906); In re Singer, 174 Fed. 208 (D. C., E. D. Pa., 1909); In re Shear,
188 Fed. 677 (D. C., W. D. N. Y., 1911); U. S. v. Appel, 221 Fed. 495
(D. C., S. D. N. Y., 1913).
9 In re Gitlin, supra n. 7; In re Rosenberg, supra n. 7.
20211 Fed. 495, (D. C., S. D. N. Y., 1913).
"249 U. S. 378, 39 S. Ct. 337, 11 A. L. R. 333 (1919). The falseness of
statements under oath is in most cases either admitted or so clearly shown
by the witness's own statements, as to be apparently beyond question. But
in this case, there was nothing in the testimony itself to show it was false,
and the witness denied the falsity of his statements. The Court said: "A
district court has power to adjudge a witness guilty of contempt solely because
in the court's opinion he is wilfully refusing to testify truthfully, and to
confine him until he shall purge himself by giving testimony which the court
deems truthful."
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wide discretion the judge has in weighing the plausibility of the
evidence offered. The danger in this extreme is apparent. A
court might arrogate to itself a power to confine a witness until
he shall purge himself by giving testimony which the court deems
truthful.' The witness in that case said: "I do not remember of
ever having seen him write." The court said that the answer on
its face did not appear to a bona fide attempt to answer the ques-
tion.
How must the falsehood manifest itself before the court may
punish for contempt? A witness may admit the falsity of his
evidence as was done in People v. Freeman. When the witness
admitted on cross-examination that the evidence he gave on the
direct examination was false, the court summarily imposed a pun-
ishment without going into any extraneous evidence to prove the
falsity of the statement. The falsehood may be obvious by reason
of unquestioned or incontrovertible evidence, in which case the
court would be shirking a clear duty if it failed to punish perjury
as contempt But the courts should not punish where the facts
are in dispute, not because of lack of power, but because a sound
public policy requires that offenders should be left to the criminal
law. The courts should not weigh conflicting evidence in con-
tempt proceedings of this nature, but should leave the alleged con-
temnors to be punished criminally. In People v. Stone' it is said
that the court must judicially know the evidence is false before
punishing the witness for contempt. In defining what is meant
by judicial knowledge it is said that this knowledge may come
either from the admissions of the witness or from incontrovertible
evidence, and the court should not act merely upon belief or con-
clusions drawn from the evidence. The ease is out of line with
federal cases, where the courts have gone a long way in contempt
proceedings in weighing conflicting evidence.
It is generally conceded that mere perjury should not be
punished as contempt unless it has the further element of obstruct-
ing justiceY Whether an act is an obstruction of the administra-
tion of justice depends, of course, on the peculiar facts of the
case. In State v. Meese,' two days were consumed in demonstrat-
"State v. Meese, 200 Wis. 460, 229 N. W. 31 (1930).
256 11. App. 233 (1930).
1"Edwards v. Edwards, 87 N. J. Eq. 546, 100 AtI. 608 (1917).
'r Edwards v. Edwards, supra n. 14.
16181 Ill. App. 475 (1913).
1 7 Supra n. 12, and n. 11.
2S4upra n. 12.
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ing the falsity of the witness's statement. It was held that an act
is not obstructive to justice on the mere ground that the time of
the court is consumed in demonstrating its falsity. The reason-
ing of the case is not quite convincing, and would appear to be
irreconcilable with decisions holding dilatory acts to be contempts
because they delay the administration of justice.
An Illinois case" states a rigid doctrine. The court must
have personal knowledge of the false evidence, or else it must ap-
pear false from the witness's own admissions, and from no other
source whatsoever; it must appear to the court beyond a reason-
able doubt that the evidence is false, that the witness knows it is
false, and that he makes the statements with a wilful and
malevolent intention of assailing the dignity of the court and
interfering with its procedure; the court cannot reach its con-
clusions from the testimony of other witnesses. The decision
practically vitiates the power of the court to punish a perjuring
witness for contempt. On the other hand, a witness was punished
by a contempt proceeding for giving false evidence which did not
constitute perjury, namely, that his wife was not in the city, al-
though it did not appear that the false evidence concerned a
material fact in the case." It was declared that the words might
not be perjury, yet, if untrue, they may constitute contempt of
court. The cases illustrate two widely divergent views of the prob-
lem under discussion. The weight of authority, however, is to the
effect that perjury does not constitute contempt of court where
it is committed in answer to a question which is rAt a material
issue in the case.'
The objection has often been raised that perjury should not
be punished as contempt because it is already punishable as a
crime and the witness is twice subjected to punishment for the
same offense.' Furthermore he is deprived of his constitutional
right to trial by jury. Only in two jurisdictions, Louisiana and
Pennsylvania," have these objections been held tenable. The great
weight of authority is to the effect that perjury, although it may
also be punished as a crime, may be a contempt. The one act con-
"" People v. Hille, 192 Ill. App. 137 (1915).
20 Young v. State, 198 Ind. 629, 154 N. E. 478 (1920).
2Heglow v. State, 24 Ohio App. 103, 155 N. E. 620 (1927; In re Hudg-
ings, supra n. 11.
2 Gibson v. Hutchinson, 148 Ia. 139, 126 N. W. 790 (1910).
"State v. Lazarus, 37 La. Ann. 314 (1885). The Court says: "A court
has no power to punish a witness who swears falsely for contempt, as perjury
is a substantive offense, and one so charged has a right to trial by jury."
2'In re Lerch's Contested Election, 21 Pa. Dist. 1113 (1912).
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stitutes two offenses, one again,-t the state, the other against the
court. A favored example is that an assault committed in court
may be both a contempt and a crime.z The court is not executing
the criminal law when it punishes false swearing.' It is vindicat-
ing and protecting itself against the obstructive act, and because
perjury is a crime is no reason why it may not also afford a basis
for punishment as a contempt.' Authority so to punish for con-
tempt is inherent in all courts, whether with or without jurisdic-
tion in criminal cases.'
Similarly the contention that a contemnor is entitled to a
trial by jury is not well-founded. The West Virginia case, State
v. Bittner,' holds that in a proceeding for contempt of court for
disobedience to its lawful order or decree there is no constitutional
right to trial by jury involved. It may be tried by the court sum-
marily. The West Virginia Constitution guarantees a jury trial
for all crimes and misdemeanors; a contempt of court is neither a
crime nor a misdemeanor, and is not controlled by the limitations
of the Constitution.
The cases do not purport to hold judicial authority is exempt
from the constitutional limitations. The purpose in contempt pro-
ceedings is to secure judicial authority from obstruction in order
that the preservation and enforcement of the Constitution can be
secured.' The trial without jury in such cases has also been held
not to violate the due process clause of the Constitution of the
United States.' The case of In re Debs convincingly disposed of
the objection by showing that the power of a court to make an
order carries with it an equal power to punish for disobedience
of that order, and the question of inquiring into the disobedience
has been a special function of the court from time immemorial.
Without the power to compel obedience, a court can no more
exist than without a judge.
Edwards v. Edwards, suprza n. 14.
People v. Tool, 35 Colo. 225, 86 Pac. 224, 229, 231; State v. Roby, 142
Ind. 168, 41 N. E. 145, 33 L. R. A. 213, 6 R. C. L. 530, § 43.
27n re Steiner, 195 Fed. 299 (D. C., S. 1). N. Y., 1912); In re Hudgings,
supra n. 11; Gibson v. Hutchinson, supra n. 22.
28In re Fellerman, supra n. 8; Gibson v. Hutchinson, supra -n. 22.
20 State v. Fredlock, 52 W. Va. 232, 243, 43 S. B. 153 (1902); State v.
Bittner, 102 W. Va. 677, 136 S. E. 202 (1926) ; In re Shear, supra n. 8.
0Supra n. 29.
2 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U. S., 247 U. S. 402, 38 S. Ct. 560 (1918);
Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 37 S. Ct. 448 (1917).
Eilenbqcker v. Plymouth Co., 134 U. S. 31, 10 S. Ct. 424 (1890).
158 U. S. 564, 15 S. Ct. 900 (1895); Storey v. People, 79 Iln. 45, 52
(1875); Hunter v. U. S., 48 App. (D. C.) 19,25, (1918).3 In 5r Debs, supra n. 33.
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Thus runs the language of the cases. Although contempt is
said to be an offense against the court and not against the state,
the argument would seem to be rather thin, as the court is not a
sovereign apart from the state, of which it is an agency, and al-
though the explanation why the case is not one for jury trial is
really historical, the result is none the less desirable.
If false testimony on the stand is contempt, a fortiori the in-
troducing of false written evidence constitutes contempt. A false
lease,' false photographs,' and forged entries in the family Bible"
have been punished as contempts. The acts of bribing a witness,'
inducing one to swear falsely,' or procuring the absence of a wit-
ness' have been held contempts. Courts have punished persons
who filed false affidavits,' and the filing of contradictory affi-
davits affords a basis for punishment for contempt.'
It is apparent from these cases that the courts possess a for-
midable power in the proceeding of contempt of court, a power
which if properly exercised can be a salutary influence in the
administration of justice. It may be a consciousness of their own
strength that has led some courts to bind this power with limita-
tions. It is submitted that an extension of this power would be
highly desirable, and would check the flippant and "loose ideas
of testifying" now current in the courts. Witnesses who obviously
lie go unpunished and unreprimanded. Persons charged with
crime give on oath evidence palpably false and are supported in
their assertions by friends and relatives. Making due allowance
for the frailties of human memory and observation, juries are ask-
ed to consider evidentiary facts of absolute incompatibility. It
can very well be asked, how can justice be administered at all
under such conditions.
-AuGusT W. P=oPLUs.
'U. S. v. Karns, 27 F. (2d) 453 (D. C. N. D. Okla., 1928).
05Blakenburg v. Mass., 172 X. E. 209 (Mass. 1930).
a071&m.
81U. S. v. Carroll, 147 Fed. 947 (D. C. D. Mont., 1906); State v. Kayser,
25 N. Mex. 245, 181 Pac. 278 (1919).89 Ricketts v. State, 111 Tenn. 380, 77 S. W. 1076 (1903) ; Beattie v. People,
33 li. App. 651 (1889), (an attorney for a client seeking a divorce fabricated
evidence to sustain a ground of adultery).
1 Keeney v. U. S., 17 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927).
a State v. Moody, 47 S. D. 111, 196 N. W. 500 (1923).
"Backer v. A. B. and B. Realty Co., 107 N. J. Eq. 246, 152 Atl. 241 (1930).
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